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Book Reviews 
Imagination by Mary Warnock. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of 
California Press, 1976. Pp. 213. $13.95. 
To tackle a subject such as imagination in barely over two hundred pages 
certainly takes courage. Mary Warnock has that quality in ample measure, 
together with shrewd insight, sound judgement and an independent turn of 
mind. She has written an illuminating and stimulating book 
Fully aware of the rashness of her endeavor, she frankly disclaims in the 
Preface any pretension to a total coverage of the topic. Rather than as the 
presentation of a complete theory, Imagination is to be regarded as "the 
record of an experiment ll (p. 9), an attempt to crace a single thread, whose 
connections are conceptual, not causal. Only later does she identify the brand 
of imagination with which she is concerned as H the romantic version of 
this concept" (p. 201), conceding that it is indeed not the only version, but 
the one which is, to her mind, true and fitting to the facts. By and large, 
however, she does not rely on such common (and often misleading) terms as 
" romantic" and "rationalistic." Her method of eXiploring the image-making 
faculty is along loosely historical lines extending from Hume through Kant:, 
Schelling, Coleridge and Wordsworth, to Husserl, Jaspers, Wittgenstein and 
her own critique of Sartre. 
I 
I 
The investigation centers on four major areas which are associated with 
particular developmental stages and particular thinkers. The first section, 
entitled "Imagination and Perception," concentrates on Hume and Kant. 
Hume, standing in a tradition of empiricist thought that goes back to Locke 
and Berkeley and even to Descanes, took imagination to play a vital role in 
our thinking, and defined ideas of the world as images. While Hume 
envisaged our experiences of objects as essentially serial, Kant introduced the 
possibility of a synthesizing ordering of the chaos of impressions by making the 
all-important distinction between the empirical and the transcendental imagination. 
For both H ume and Kant it is imagination that allows us to go beyond the 
bare data of sensation and to bridge the gap between mere sensation and 
intelligible thought. Moving from the cognitive to the creative aspects of 
imagination, Part II is devoted to "Imagination and Creative Art." Again the 
focus is on Hume and Kant, with the addition of Schelling. Though Kant, like 
Hwne, regarded the activity of the creative imagination as inexplicable, he 
nevertheless made a systematic attempt to expound it, and he linked our sense 
of the sublime with ideas of reason. With Schelling (and Fichte) the climate I' 
and tone change as the distinction between legitimate thought and metaphysical 
speculation is done away with, and the conscious and unconscious workings of !, 
the imagination are fused into a unity. So to Part III, a consideration of the ~ I 
theory and practice of Coleridge and Wordsworth, neither of whom were [ 
systematic thinkers. Coleridge sought primarily in his excursions into philosophy , 
to find a framework for his thoughts and to establish some metaphysical 
70 
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foundation for his beliefs. For Wordsworth, as for Coleridge, the imagination 
was an active power, generated from within, that enables us to see the general 
in the specific and hence to intuit in the image qua symbol a meaning beyond 
itself. The emotion-laden seeing of the image in the mind's-eye becomes in 
effect identical with the perception of ultimate truths. Mary Warnock's 
interpretation of Coleridge's and Wordsworth's theory and practice of im-
agination as equivalent to a direct cognition of truth helps to account for the 
cardinal importance of trus concept among the Romantics. The founh 
section, "The Nature of the Mental Image," goes on to raise the question as 
to what is actually meant by "image," and what is the connection between 
images and the imagination. How does the mind discriminate spontaneously 
between its images and its perceptions? How can a certain appeal to intro-
spection be avoided? How far can we separate thought from seeing, concept-
using from sensing? These are the psycho-philosophical questions that are 
discussed, with reference to the phenomenologists, in a section that is, perhaps 
inevitabily, more polemical and tentative than the earlier chapters. The brief 
Conclusion, "Imagination and Education," emphasizes the integral part played 
in our lives by the daily exercise of various kinds of imagination, and urges the 
need to educate not solely the intelligence but also the feelings, including taste 
and sensiblilty, so as to produce ,people of cultivated imagination, receptive to art 
and nature. 
To summarize with such brevity may perhaps seem unfair to so subtle and 
complex a book as Imagination, but it is the only way to show what channels 
of thought are explored. The real merit of Imagination is two-fold. It stems 
firstly from the lucidity of the exposition of often complicated, crabbed notions. 
Mary Warnock is a model of clarity who can handle an arguI;11ent beautifully 1 
knowing when to offer concrete, even homely, examples as a welcome terra 
finna to a reader who might otherwise flounder in a sea of abstractions. She 
controls her difficult materials with great skill and firmness, resisting the 
temptation to digress, to overload and so to blur the essentials. Where 
necessary she does digress, and she says so, as in her helpful explanation of the 
phenomenological theory of perception (pp. 142-149). This is an example of 
her kindly and considerate treatment of the reader for she explains without 
either assuming prior knowledge or talking down in over-simplifications. It is 
this above all that will make Imagination accessible and valuable (if not easy!) 
to readers as yet untutored in philosophy. The phrase, II we urgently need to 
pause and make a determined effort at clarity" (p. 138) is characteristic of her 
manner. Acknowledging the toughness of her topic, Mary Warnock writes 
with a rare and appealing blend of modesty and self-assurance. 
The second great virrue of Imagination lies in its honesty and freshness of 
approach. Analysis is nicely combined with questioning of accepted positions. 
In this Mary Warnock is as tactful as in her actirude to the reader; her 
criticisms are judicious in content and expressed without aggressiveness, but she 
is not afraid to confront difficulties, to tal{e up a position and to make a 
judgement. Her treatment of Coleridge is a case in point: she squarely faces 
the controversial problem of the extent of his indebtedness to Gennan philo-
sophers, proceeds cautiously and pragmatically to examine the evidence of his 
reading, and his misreadings, and concludes that Coleridge had more enthusiasm 
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than consistent or detailed understanding of Kant and his successors and that 
he tended to pick up whatever suited his ,purposes. This is no startlingly 
original view; yet it is deduced from an examination of the evidence, it is 
argued whit vigor and conviction, and stated without evasiveness. There is 
throughout Imagination a sound common sense, a mental crispness that is 
specially welcome-and rare-in a discussion of such an elusive topic. 
The book is not without fault, however. The Conclusion above all must be 
greeted with some reservation. Without impugning the validity of Mary 
Warnock's pleas for the education of the imagination, I find them strangely 
inappropriate at that point-matter for some kind of .postscript or corollary 
rather than as a conclusion. The book ends in effect on a preaching note out 
of keeping with its main exegetical tenor. This also leads to the question of 
its unity which arouses some unease. There is a thread of continuity in the con-
cept of imagination that is being traced, but it is not always as evident as one 
might wish. In spite of certain references forwards and backwards, the 
sections almost seem separate entities. Quite apart from that change of tonc 
at the very end, the extended and passionate treatment of the phenomenologists 
and the undue concentration on Sartre arc unbalancing to the whole. What is 
more, Imagination may well earn disapproval and cven scorn from certain 
academics because it docs not regurgitate previous secondary literature and 
arm itself with the external apparatus of scholarship. Nevertheless Mary War-
nod: has given us a refreshing and informative study that will be useful to 
many outside her own field of philosophy. 
LILIAN R. FURST 
University of Texas at Dallas 
Language Truth and Poetry: Notes towards a Pbilosophy of Literature by 
Graham Dunstan Martin. Edinburgh: At the University Press, 1975. Pp. 
vii + 354. $14.50. 
This often engaging, sometimes irritating, polemical study develops the notion 
that ,( the basic struggle (is) between those who admit complexity and un-
certainty, and those whose truth is always certain ... and therefore never true" 
(p. 294). The main object of its attack is the modern crisis of the" two 
cultures," a crisis toward which wc have been developing for the last three 
centuries, and which poses scientific discourse and its absolute claims to 
truth-value against poetic discourse with all of its exploitations of the wealth 
and thus the indeterminacy of language. It defines a model of language usage 
which, though somewhat equivocally, identifies scientific and poetic discourse 
and sets both off against linguistic and logical theories which treat language as 
a tool for creating prop?sitions of absolute truth. As regards the first purpose, ! 
Graham Dunstan MartIn betrays not a little ambivalence, since he never j: 
succeeds in esc~ping the science-poetry dich?tomy that he putatively seeks to II 
cancel. As for the second, tIus study brmgs to bear some much needed : 
linguistic and philosophical analysis in the interest of destroying dogmas and i 
I: 
______________ .......... J 
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myths piously and uncritically held in both camps. If the book's success is 
qualified, it remains an important study in a field still cultivated by only a 
small minority of literary students, that concerning the linguistic and philo-
sophical underpinnings of poetic language. 
The book divides into three parts. The first is devoted to developing a 
coherence rather than a correspondence theory of meaning within an ambiance 
of concern defined by modern linguistics and theories of meaning. In this 
section, the most original 2nd enlightening of the book, Martin's main enemies 
are behaviorists such as Bloomfield and Skinner who insist on treating man's usc 
of language as a strictly passive response to external stimuli. Against behaviorist 
denials of the mental realm of conceptual thinking, Martin argues a position 
mainly indebted to structural semantics. This position begins from the 
semiotic triangle first made popular in Ogden and Richards' Tbe Meaning of 
Meaning and goes on to develop a model of language usage that interrelates 
word, concept, and referent. This model entails chapters on denotation and 
connotation, the meaning of proper names, metaphor, and the problems of 
reference in scientific and poetic discourse. 
The second part concerns the similarities and differences between scientific 
and poetic uses of language and builds on the first part by proposing the ways 
in which both kinds of discourse construct models of the real world that are 
essentially metaphoric. Here, Martin's argument should prove immensely 
gratifying to literary theoreticians who have discovered that the gulf between 
science and literature canonized by scientists and the new critics alike has 
ceased to be meaningful. Martin makes much of philosophers of science who 
have seized on post-Einsteinian relativity to demolish science's claim to absolute 
truth. Science's essentially tentative use of metaphorical models to make sense 
of the data of the physical world is defined against the claims of formal logic 
to reduce language usage to making statements only about empirically verifiable 
situations. Martin's polemic requires the resuscitation of poetic language by 
raising it to the status of a scientific usage defined as primarily poetic and 
metaphorical. JUSt how successful this realignment is I will examine later on. 
The third part includes two chapters that, respectively, defend poetry's 
cultural and political uses in combating the absolutisms of fascism, communism, 
and western conservatism and question the '\'vays in which poetry's function of 
bringing us closer to our ",vorld may be perverted into becoming a fantasized 
substitution for it. 
This brief summary does not engage the book's free-wheeling movement over 
:J. large range of subjects. \Vhatever its theoretical shortcomings, doubtless the 
result of the author's attempt to cover a vast territory in too short a space, it 
exhibits an impassioned concern for the place of fictive discourse in a culture 
alternatively dedicated to displacing it in favor of '\'arious scientific myths or 
to huding it mindlessly. For Martin, literary artifacts arc one of modem 
man's essential weapons against the intellectual and politica.l absolutisms that 
would freeze human reality into a single closed structure or model: 
I would say ... that the ability to "imagine" what cannot possibh" 
be Uue is a c011ditio11 of our imelligcncc. '''ere ;\1:1n not capable ~f 
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It is true that this capacity lays us open to the dangers of meaningless 
metaphysics, jejune dogma, religious and political fanaticism; but Qur 
incorrect beliefs al'e the price we have ·to pay for our correct ones .... 
The only safeguard here is in fact not to direct our minds narrowly 
upon a smgle track of truth-for who can be sure exactly where that is?-
but to seek the greatest possible flexibility of the imagination. Fiction, 
drama and poetry are in short a training for the mind, an invaluable 
exercise in flexibility, a priming for the intelligence. 
Their justification is not so much that they "show us truth"; for 
truth depends not upon the word or the concept but on external fact. 
It is rather that they allow our minds to contemplate a mass of different 
possibilities, a mass of might-have-beens and very-nearly-weres. Such 
flexibility of mind is evidently of practical utility to us, since it allows 
us to speculate about alternative possibilities. Fiction allows our minds 
to play. ('PP, 80-81; emphases in the original) 
If none of this is completely original (Northrop Frye has previously argued 
a similar utility for fictions), its particular cogency derives from a careful 
analysis of the linguistic and epistemological foundations of poetic language. In 
this respect we have here a study that is rare enough in the contemporary 
literature of literary criticism: a justification of literary language that depends 
upon a close and extended examination of the linguistic, logical, and philo-
sophical underpinnings of language usage in general and of scientific language 
in particular. 
The objections and queries to follow must be understood within the context 
of my essential agreement both with the book's over-all purposes and with many 
of its specific points. It has a number of the ingredients of a major study of 
literary theory; it. however, falls JUSt short of that stature. Since the bulk of the 
book's innovative comment occurs in its first part, I will concentrate on that, 
though not exclusively. 
The attack in Chapter one on the behaviorist rejection of "mentalist ~ ex-
planations of language meaning aims at rehabilitating the "concept," which 
Martin equates with the semantic element of a lexeme (p. 20). As Martin says, 
II we do not need to know exactly bow the word is connected to the con-
cept, whether this link is associative or causal, or anything else II (pp. 20-21). 
Though he mentions Saussure in his bibliography, it seems to me that he might 
very well have made use of the Saussure-Hjelmslev model of signifiant-signifie, 
since this would apparendy have short-circuited the need to take on Skinner 
and Bloomfield. Within this model "concept" or " semantic features" 
(signifie) would come into existence (for Martin's purposes) not as the result 
of human mental activity, but rather as a coefficient of a delimited signifiant 
(or word), both of which exist only within a total sign system conceived as a 
system of differences. In fact, Martin's refusal to make use of contemporary 
structuralist and semiotic analysis of codes remains puzzling, inasmuch as these 
would probably have contributed much to his argument. 
In Chapter three Maron attacks the attempts of some contemporary linguists 
to deny meaning, as distinct from reference, to proper names. Martin's argument, 
which is generally convincing, insists that proper nouns, like class nouns, do 
in fact connote semantic features, by calling to mind the reference of the name 
itself, i. e., the person or thing that bears the name. This chapter, like several 
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others in the book, ap,pe3rs at first somewhat tangential to the main line of the 
thesis (indeed, more signposting is needed in a book that covers so much ground). 
It would appear, however, that Martin is attempting to bolster his general 
contention regarding the dominance of the semantic rather than the referential 
axis of language, in order to support his later position on the primacy of a 
coherence rather than a correspondence theory of model usage in both poetry 
and science. 
In his discussion of denotation and connotation in Chapter four, Martht re~ 
fuses to draw a sharp line between them, but rather describes a spectnun of 
semantic features moving from an inner core of connotations (U logically cri-
terial connotations") to an outer shell of connotations that the word may suggest. 
In doing so, he gives too litde attention to the fact that, though the distinction 
between connotation-as-intension (definition) and connotation-as~suggestion may 
be difficult to draw for any specific word, the distinction remains a necessary a 
priori schema for classifying different meanings of the same word. He ignores 
the ways in which metaphorical meanings of words depend upon the assumption 
of a "violated" literal meaning. No matter how difficult the distinction is 
to make, somewhere along the line we must and do make a sharp distinction 
between literal and metaphorical meanings, simply because neither kind of 
meaning makes any sense except in terms of an opposition benveen them. 
Later, Martin will attack scientific discourse to the extent that it seeks to 
delimit verbal meanings to the denotative, under the impulse to make verbal 
statements reflect the physical world exhaustively. But surely, the differences 
between scientific and poetic language are more complex than those founded 
on "less" and "more" admissible connotations respectively. "Literal" usage 
must remain, if only heuristically, a foundation of metaphorical meaning-and 
therefore distinct from it-because metaphor to be recognized as such must 
present itself as a violation of this literal meaning. Whatever one wants to make 
of Martin's larger argument about the similiarities between scientific and poetic 
models of the world-and this is considerable-the argument is not particularly 
helped by this superficial solution to the problem of what exactly constitutes 
metaphorical meaning. 
Chapter five exploits this putative fluidity in the relations between literal and 
metaphorical meaning. and here Martin makes one of his major points: 
The structure of every concept is different from that of every other: 
its content varies from person to person; its extension and intension are 
both indeterminate; and indetenninacy is a necessary feature of language, 
to be welcomed moreover because it reflects both the outer world of 
facts and the inner world of thoughts. Any philosophical or linguistic 
doctrine which tends to conceal these facts is grossly misleading, and 
betrays truth in the name of that delusive idol, certainty. (p. 67) 
This argument ultimately leads, in the book's second and third parts, to an 
extended defense of poetic language as the most adequate reflection of the 
indeterminacy of both the physical world and of our thought about it. In 
other words, Martin turns the attacks of scientists and philos~hers on literary 
language back on themselves, by pointing out how scientific and philosophical 
models of the world are only adequate to it when they admit indeterminacy. But 
c.' ____________________________________________________________________ __ 
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one wonders here, as elsewhere in reading the book, why scientific language is 
brought in here, particularly when the author launches an attack in part twO on 
scientific language specifically for violating the lessons taught by post-Einsteinian 
relativity? This is only one of the places where Martin registers a rather 
equivocal attitude toward the whole poetry-science quarrel that his book is 
intended to abrogate. It is almost as if he felt the need to make poetry 
respectable by assimilating it to science and to do this by assimilating science to 
poetry. He never seems to escape backward glances over his shoulder at the 
very scientism he wants to avoid. If the science-poetry opposition is Martin's 
main object of attack, he has allowed science to win some kind of victory here, 
if only because he takes for granted that scientific claims to absolute truth are 
something he must continually keep in mind. It has historically been, after all, 
mainly the scientists who have created this particular quarr.el, and literature has 
always granted science pre-eruptive attack by acquiescing in just this way of 
setting the question. Along comes Martin, then, ,vith an exemplary attempt to 
get beyond this simple-minded dichotomy, only to mire himself deeper in it 
through his strenuous attempts to extricate himself and us. In doing so much, 
however, I must point out that at least he addresses himself to the problem 
"where it is at" in most people's minds. I could wish that having gone so far, 
his polemic might have finally destroyed the quarrel once and for all, rather than 
only drawing an armed peace. 
The handling of the problem of reference in Chapter six is exemplary. Martin 
rightly grasps that science's claims to superior truth-value for its own models 
is based on a belief that propositions are true by reason of their correspondence 
to some extra-verbal state of affairs (one remembers with glee Wittgenstein's 
destruction of his own argument founded on this assumption in the Tractatus 
Logico-Pbilosophicus). Martin argues rather for a coherence theory of truth-
value, by which scientific as wen as poetic models may claim truth to the 
extent that the models themselves posit their own criteria of truth. His handling 
of the" King of France is bald" insolubilium is consequently convincing, when 
he shows that "language points to a referent even when that referent does not 
in fact exist" Cp.76). 
Despite these strictures and queries, the number of points the book makes 
ranges over a wide variety of problems that this reviewer finds often intriguing, 
and I agree with the solutions more often than not. 
Martin takes the question of reference in fictions out of the realm of corres-
pondence and places it rightly in the realm of coherence. Thus fictions deal 
in "constructed referents" (p. 89), which, like "gravitation" and "relativity," 
are referents which discourse invents in order to make reference to them. The 
existential world is thus referred to not directly but through the models of that 
world which poetic discourse constructs. His notion of the "generalizing" 
function of language likewise contributes a philosophical foundation to an 
aspect of poetic discourse that we have all recognized more-or-Iess intuitively. 
Since the heart of language for Marcin is its semantic function, which means 
its capacity to assign connotations to words, the ability of poetic discourse to 
represent the complexity and fluidity of the world by collocating words and 
their connotations in unusual ways receives here a powerful justification. Despite 
my disagreement with the theoretical foundations of l\1artin's theory of metaphor 
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(i. e., he seems unaware of the ways in which we must unmetaphor metaphors 
in order to understand them), his notion that in poetry we are forced into an 
awareness of the connotations of words, thereby increasing Qlir awareness of 
the things themselves to which the words refer, takes a traditional point and 
makes it new. 
Finally, his third and last section, on the ways in which literary language 
remains one of our most potent weapons against political absolutisms, makes a 
convincing argument for poetry's radically necessary function in a world where 
political polemics depends very much on people's assumptions that language 
can refer to U the truth" in a detenninate and absolute way. For Martin, the 
glory at once of the world, of human thought, and of language whether 
scientific or poetic lies in the irreducible wealth and fluid indeterminacy of the 
elements which compose all three. If the author has perhaps attempted to argue 
on too many questions here and to fight on too many fronts, with the conse-
quence that some thrusts fare better than others, this is said to take nothing 
away from the remarkable achievement of the book as a whole. It marks an 
important contribution to an area in which literary studies have been too much 
impoverished: namely, in questioning the theoretical foundations on which 
writers and readers of poetic fictions have operated, and which they have been 




Adventu1·e, Mystery, and Romance: Fornmla Stories as Art and Popular Culture 
by John G. Cawelti. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976. Pp. vii + 
335. $15.00. 
" 'He says plain things in a formal and abstract way, to be sure,'" admits 
I Boswell, half-heartedly defending an author named Harris. '" But his method is 
good: for to have clear notions upon any subject, we must have recourse to 
anal yrick arrangement.''' 
", Sir,'" counters Dr. Johnson, '" it is what every body does, whether they 
will or no. But sometimes things may be made darker by definition. I see a cow. 
I define her, Animal quadrupes rumintms cornutum. But a goat ruminates, 
and a cow may have no horns. Cow is plainer.' !) 
John G. Cawelti's study of Adventure, Mystery, and Romance merits both a 
Johnson1an attack and something a little stronger than Boswell's faint praise. 
Professor Cawelti does have recourse to analytic arrangement, and he attempts, 
with mixed results, to apply a Herculean methodology to a still more Herculean 
task: an aesthetic evaluation and a cultural, or cross-cultural, analysis of related 
literary forms from Oedipus Rex to The Godfather. Cawelti's statements on 
affective issues r2.nge from Homer to Bob Hope, and he discusses all of the 
major literary genres while devoting the book to an analysis of the n popular 
genres," or "formula" stories of his title. It may jar us to see Rex Morgan, 
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M. D., practicing alongside Dreiser and Fitzgerald, as in Cawelti's earlier Apostles 
of the Self-Made Man; it may pain us, in this current book, to see FauIlmer 
compared to Irving Wallace. But such comparisons-when, in fact, there are 
significant thematic and structural parallels-may clarify Faulkner's technique 
more effectively than the traditional comparisons of Faulkner with Joyce or 
Hemingway. We recognize Faulkner's use of melodramatic and gothic con-
ventions, but a comparison with the class of writers Cawelti calls II popular 
melodramatists/' whose novels require a steady stream of sensational crises, 
immediately illustrates Faulkner's more controlled and finely integrated use of 
such conventions (p. 264), Similarly, the structuralist search for common 
forms-connecting classical literature not only with popular or folk works, but 
with oral myth, economic tracts, advertising slogans-attempts to bridge an 
artificially created gap between H literature" and its cultural context. Indeed, 
any critic who rejects simple textual explication in favor of historical or 
cultural or psychological analysis will be interested in what Cawelti tries to do. 
We need more studies willing to connect folklore and popular literature with 
traditional literary topics. Cawelti himself modestly disclaims any definitive 
results for what is in fact an unusually ambitious work, arguing instead that 
his subject" is significant and complex enough to resist the limited learning and 
competence of a single individual II (301). 
Unfortunately, neither Cawelti's style nor his analytic skill is equal to his 
intellectual ambition. His writing is generally ov,erwrought, his conclusions 
hesitant. Here, for example, is the final paragraph of a chapter on "The Art 
of the Classical Detective Story" : 
That modenl European and American cultures can produce and enjoy 
both the straight detective story and its ironic, absurd inversion is 
either a sign of profound cultural splits and tensions or of rich and 
diverse creativity or perhaps of both. Whether the classical detective 
formula will be able to assimilate its antithesis and still generate a new 
kind of mystery formula remains to be seen. (137-8) 
This complex statement of the obvious finishes as a curiously anticlimactic 
refusal to affirm anything. And such dulling caution combined with unnecessary 
complexity, often applied to self-evident propositions, is all too characteristic of 
the book. "Even the most addicted reader of classical detective stories," 
ventures Cawelti, "probably derives greater pleasure from a first-rate Agatha 
Christie than from one of her more plodding improvisations" (106). By the 
insertion of "probably" Cawelti turns tautology into academic parody. 
Confusion of terms and a confusing methodology affiict Cawelti in every 
chapter, perhaps most obviously in the key term of his subtitle. What, exactly, 
is meant by a "formula"? Cawelti devotes his first chapter to " The Study of 
Literary Formulas," in which he not only fails to define the term in a clear and 
consistent way, but also succeeds in introducing a series of still more confusing 
and overlapping definitions of other terms, like "genre" and n archetype." A 
"formula" is defined as "a structure of narrative or dramatic conventions-II 
employed in many works (5); it refers U to large plot types" and "story 
types" that are themselves cross-cultural, if not universal (5~6), and are what 
some scholars call "archetypes 11 (6); "formula" is then redefined as "a 
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combination Of synthesis of a number of specific cultural conventions with a 
more universal story form or archetype" (6) and next becomes" a means of 
generalizing the characteristics of large groups of individual works from certain 
combinations of cultural materials and archetylpal story patterns" (7). Cawelti 
admits that "formula" and "genre" may create confusion, since they some-
times mean the same thing, but he uses" formula" to describe what others might 
tefm H popular genre," although finally he doesn't think the terms matter so 
long as "we are clear just what we are talking about and why" (6-7). But 
by the next page he is obliged to create portmanteau words out of his basic 
terms in order to sustain an increasingly complex-and confusing-argument. 
His literary analyses tend to get lost among hyphenated neologisms like "arche-
type-genre" and "a formula-genre, or what is sometimes more vaguely called a 
popular genre" (8). 
'" I looked into his book,'" Johnson had said of NIr. Harris, II, and thought 
he did not understand his own system.'" If Cawelti understands his system 
it is only through private definitions of common words, like "stereotype," 
which Webster defines as "anything repeated or reproduced without variation." 
Cawelti introduces the term "vitalized stereotype," which is presumably given 
force by adding "truly" and significance by linking it with the omnipresent 
l( archetype": "The ultimate test of a truly vitalized stereotype is the degree 
to which it becomes an archetype, thereby transcending its particular cultural 
moment and maintaining an interest for later generations and other cultures" 
(ll). There is too much mystery here and not enough adventure. 
Cawelti's style reflects a confused methodology, and the ambitious scope of 
the book strains both method and style. "Formula" suffers because it is made 
to bear the weight of several aims and the meaning of several disciplines, and 
Cawelti seems to prefer it to "genrc" at least in part becaus"e he hopes to use 
it to unite the study of the classical genres, like tragedy and comedy, with the 
study of "popular genres," like detective fiction or western. He argues against 
the pejorative meaning of "formulaic," and he apparently employs oxymoronic 
terms like "vitalized stereotype" in order to endow the concept of "formula" 
with more positive qualities than mindless repetition and cliche. But he merely 
succeeds in multiplying categorical dilemmas. What, for example, does "non-
formulaic novel" refer to except what the rest of us normally call" literature" ? 
And how does one distinguish between the "formulaic" and "the nonfor-
mulaic novel"? His early definitions of formula are so broad that they must 
apply to any novel. Crime and Punisbntent, he argues, is not a detective novel 
because it employs "all the basic elements of the detective story" in "a com-
pletely different, nonformulaic, arrangement" (133). But it must then be 
formulaic in other terms: "Crime and Punisbment is not structured around 
the inquiry, but around the change in the murderer's soul" (132). Definition 
becomes a category game-classical and hard-boiled and anti-detective; we lose 
sight of the possibilities of the form itself and what that form might teach us 
about an individual ,vorl;:. 
Thus Cawelti "lmdermines two fundamental reasons for combining "popular" 
and "classical" literary categories through formal analysis. For example, 
having compared the detective story to the modern novel as a whole, he argues: 
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Even though superficially similar, the difference between a detective 
story and the multiple perspectives of a twentieth-century novel re-
mains basic. In the detective story, when we arrive at the detective's 
solution, we have arrived at the tIuth, the single right perspective and 
ordering of events. (89) 
This relegates the connections bct\vecn a popular form and the <l serious" modern 
noyd to superficiality, just as it relegates the detective story itself to formulaic 
oblidon. Using a traditional but limiting view '\vhich equates the detective story 
with rationality, Cawelti spends much of his critical time deciding on admission 
to an exclusive club of detective writers and neatly disposes (with the aid of 
i\tiichacI Holquist) of clever foreigners like Borges and Robbe-Grillet and 
Nabokov (" anti-detective"). As a founding father, Wilkie Collins is of 
course admitted, although The j'vIoanstone is a little too clever for its own good, 
with its " variety of narrators" and "a scale of rime and space much larger than 
the majority of the works that have succeeded it" (134). Ca\velti docs manage to 
close the door on Bleak House: "the element of investigation of the mystery 
is so completely subordinated to othcr narrative interests in this novel that 
Bleak Hause is no more a detective novcl than Crime and Punishment" (136). 
But perhaps Crime and Punishment and Bleak House, like The 111001lstone, 
exploit the possibilities of the detective formula more fully and more i111-
aginathTely than the typical versions of the formula that have followed them. 
Dickens's ability to integrate the detective story with his investigation of Esther's 
parentage is essential for his control over an immense novel, and a strong case 
could be made for the centrality of the detective story as a controlling structural 
device. I am not faulting Cavi'elti for failing to read Dickens as I would read 
him, but rather for failing to recognize the significant dimensions of the very form 
he writes about in such detail. By arbitrarily reducing the detective story to 
an affirmation of the rational, Cawelti reinforces a limited critical position and 
helps to minimize the importance of his own subject. 
It is precisely this inability to sustain comparisons between "popular" and 
"serious" works in an illuminating or original way which makes Ca'\velti's 
endeayor so disappointing. The more he attempts to combine these categories, 
the more clearly hc reyeals the inadequacies of his method. He takes on, 
for example, the inevitable discussion of Oedipus as detective story. Is it or 
isn't it? He decides against, but adds: 
Despite these differences, there is an important connection between 
the compelling fascination of the drama of Oedipus and the interest 
of the detectiyc story; both depend on our fascination with the un-
coycring of hiddcn guilt or sccrets. Some psychoanalysts havc theorized 
that this attraction arises from unresolved infantile fcelings about the 
primal scene leading to an adult compulsion to repeat the experience 
III the disguise of fantasy. If so, Oedi1nrs deals with the primal scenc 
f~scir:ation in a m?rc di~ect and c.xplicit way, \~'hile the detective story 
t!ISgcllSCS the exp<:nence 1~ syr.nbobc form, as Imght be expected from a 
l~~~~~ry type deSigned pnmanly for purposes of relaxation and escape. 
l~\"~rything is wrong \\"ith this argument: Cawelti attempts to usc psycho-
:m;llytic theory without acknowledging it (by the formula: "Some have 
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said ... .If so ... " ,) and perhaps more importantly, without analyzing its S\Veep-
ing reductionism in the case. He concludes, peculiarly, that Oedipus portrays 
primal scene material more directly than formula detective stories. Even a 
casual acquaintance with modern detective stories would contradict this. The 
solution to James McClure's Caterpillar Cop involves a remarkably dir.ect primal 
scene reconstruction; and an important modern detective writer, like Ross 
MacDonald, appears to pattern his novels around the discovery of an 
original parental crime. Cawelti seems to suggest that the direct representation 
of infantile or sexual material is related to artistic success or originality while a 
more symbolic representation of such material is characteristic of escape fiction. 
This would make Spillane a more "symbolic" writer than Sophocles and 
cast a new, if confusing, light on pornography. Finally, we must wonder 
about the critical terms themselves. What exactly makes one work more 
explicit and direct than another, what constitutes '( disguise" or disguising" in 
symbolic form"? Throughout this book there are vague conjecturings about 
affective issues, but a noticeable failure to use the theoretical constructs of 
psychological critics like Norman Holland or Simon Lesser, beyond a mention 
of their work in the bibliography. In his discussion of Oedipus we see again 
the unfortunate formula of Cawelti's own criticism: vague terms and vague 
style betray a shaky methodology and result in a failure to make significant 
connections between the widely different materials studied. 
The scope of this book alone should still command the interest of anyone 
working with popula! fictional forms or with major writers who make use of 
popular forms. In addition, many of Cawelti's close readings of specific popular 
writers and sub-genres, like the "police procedural," are illuminating precisely 
because they have escaped the larger methodological and stylistic limitations 
of the work as a whole. Historical parallels, such as the connection made 
between Spillane'S work and the temperance novel, are startling and valuable. 
And Cawelti's enthusiasm for such a range of material does break through the 
encrusted surface of his prose. But, like too many of his concepts and like the 
larger aims of this ambitious work, the whole tends to be made darker by 
definition. 
ALBERT D. RUITER 
University of California, Los Angeles 
George O'abbe's Poetry by Peter New. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1976. 
Pp. 248. $16.95. 
George Crabbe 0754-1832) wrote early imitations 'Of Spenser, Raleigh, 
Cowley, pre-Romantics, and came, much later, to admire Wordsworth, "whom 
I read & laughed at till I caught a touch of his disease," but even those who see 
\Vordsworthian, Shelleyan, and Keatsian traits in the later work of this last 
master of the heroic couplet agree tllat his large poetic output, including 
certain religious, philosophical, and aesthetic attitudes embodied in it, Was well 
rooted in the 18th Century. Just how independent of those roots his opinions, 
sensibilities, technique, even his couplets became as his poetry rose into full 
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flower in the first two decades of the 19th Century is one of the problems, among 
auite a few this unique poet poses, has always posed. Whether he will forever 
pose it and others might depend upon how many more studies of the scope ot 
skill of Peter New's George Crabbe's PoeU'y (St. Martin's Press, 1976) the 
future provides. Mr. New's book has not laid all those problems to rest, nor 
does he pretend it has done so. Crabbe is too great, complex, and prolific for 
that. New's study is the latest, not perh~ps the most readable but, I think, the 
best in an enlarging body of criticism that tries to justify the ways of Crabbe 
to modern man: by placing him comprehensibly in one or another main stream 
in English literature and then by demonstrating that his achievement so 
transcends Ius time that he has become, in Leavis's teasing tribute, "a living 
classic "-the phrase wherewith New launches the first page of his eight-chapter 
book. 
Even Pollard's 485-page anthology Crabbe: the Critical Heritage (1972), 
since it reprints no criticism after 1890, can give but a faint notion, in its 
introduction, of the accumulating body of favorable criticism of Crabbe in the 
intervening eighty-five years. Of the dozen book-length studies published on 
Crabbe (two in German, one in Russian), four of the better ones have appeared 
within the last two decades, during which a new biography and four selections 
of his poems (three of them instructively edited) have also appeared, as well 
as important chapters on him in several books on larger subjects, and many 
articles. Dust jacket blurbs, like the trade-names of many other commercial 
products, often announce that we shall find within precisely what it is the pro-
duct turns out to lack. Not so of the chief claim composed for New: "no 
book previously published on Crabbe has analyzed in detail such a wide range 
of his poetry or offered such a complete assessment of his literary achievement." 
This rich, dense study surpasses others, first, in bulk (Huchon's heavily bio-
graphical 561-page tome of 1907 is a critical lightweight), for it is thrice the 
length of Haddakin's Poetry of Crabbe (1955), twice that of Sigworth's Nature's 
Sternest Poet (1965) or my own George Crabbe (1965). New's procedure, too, 
has an advantage that with a poet like Crabbe only bulk can handle. Unlike 
Haddakin's and Sigworth's, his basic approach-though he adopts other devices 
intended to give his book unity and prevent tiresomeness-is chronological 
examination of the canon. After a somewhat formidable opening chapter, 
erudite, rather intricately argued, on Crabbe's assumptions, feelings, intentions, 
and accomplishments as well as his position vis a vis the Augustans he sprang 
from, the Romantics he survived, and the Victorian novelists he influenced, New 
tufns to Crabbe's earliest published poem, the "Inebriety" of 1775, and con-
cludes, nearly two hundred pages later, with the last of the Posthumous Tales 
(1834) he chooses to discuss. What he considers the several dozen best or most 
revealing of Crabbe's many dozens of character sketches and tales he submits to 
careful explications de texte, analyses that can run to over 3000 words each. He 
tries also to sustain, obliquely or indirectly, a IUnrung treatment of half a dozen 
theses, most introduced in the first chapter. All are significant though not all 
are original, and he handles them interestingly though not with equal success. 
The book's solidity, therefore, and its occasional brilliance, lies more in those 
well-\vrought explications. With a kind of ambidexterity New presents analyses 
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poems while insinuating sufficient narrative exposition to satisfy the needs of the 
reader who is not-the conscientious reader, for New's tight prose demand~ 
unflagging attention. His discussions of the well-known "Peter Grimes" 
(lJorougb, XXII), for example, and the litde-lmown "Edward Shore" (Tales, 
XI) arc both subtle and clear. Occasionally he forgets-or perhaps juSt fails. 
His handling of "The Confidant" (Tales, XVI) could well bewilder the 
novice and may stand, too, as an example of something rare but more serious, 
actual misreading or oversight. That the bbclanailed \vife was once not only 
indiscreet bur in consequence bec?me the mother of a "fatherless" child is vital 
to a full appreciation of just those ironies of diction, situation, and character 
relationships that New's ear and mind seem so good at catching in Crabbe's 
sophisticated verse. 
One does wish, though, that some of these long analyses were more obviously 
joined to the book as a whole, to its running them;ttic strands, than they seem to 
be. Surely, however, they come to support \veU three of Ne"v's declarations, 
none wholly origind but none hitherto so systematically approached: that 
Crabbe is the greatest short-narrative poet in English since Chaucer, that he 
surpasses the 18th-Century novel "in the range of contemporary moral and 
social attitudes he has dramatized," whereby he is joined only by Chaucer and 
Shakespeare and <I some of the major 1100relists of the nineteenth century," and 
that Crabbe may be (here, as a last-page surprise, New hedges a little) a major 
rather than a minor poet. John Speirs in his Poetry into Novel (19il) had 
" inclined to see" Tbe Prelude, Don Juan, and Crabbe's 1812 Tales (C as the most 
solid of the larger-scale achievements" of 19th-Century English poetry. New 
rders four times to Speirs's chapter on Crabbe, but the final estimate of his 
much larger survey is clearly more cautious, though not less persuasive. 
Most readers of George Crabbe's Poetry \vould, I think, have appreciated a 
descriptiye bibliography of the many manuscripts, scattered among many col-
lections, that New makes frequent and skillful usc of, and some of its readers 
would feel, I suspect, more comfortable had New gken more frequent credits 
to preYious studies of Crabbe. He often seems to present as discovery \vhat 
is restatement. But he as oftcn reworks old material freshly. Among se'\'eral 
::spccts of Crabbe that New handles at length while acknowcdging that others 
h:wc done so, he probably purs to best use t\VO platitudes-one, that Crabbe is 
much preoccupied with how human character changes in time, sometimes for the 
better, more often for the worse (" contaminate" is onc of New's favorite 
\1' words); the other, that Crabbe's descriptions are sometimes distinctly reminiscent 
of Hogarth. Ne",," fuses these commonplaces into a sound and most handy 
conception of Crabbc's gradually sophisticating dC\'clopment of a It progress 
form" 'which the poet composes many '\'ariations of, in shape and procedure, 
hut which he also occasionally "escaped" altogether, ""ith striking results. 
Another perception-this time profound and, I belie,,'e, original-that helps give 
Xew's book some de~ree of that nriety and coherence that I-hdd:.kin rightly 
fe:1.red a chronologie'.l 8pproach might preclude is the extent to which C;abl;c 
wrcsrled in his t:.\cs with paradoxes of time and freedom and their inter-
~: rcbtionships. And :.lthough the first chapter's attempt to cOIwince us right off 
m:1~' be oycr-subtle :mcl under-supported, ~e,,\' is right in p3iring Johnson with 
:, Pupe (who carns, in bcr, but one-third :1S DUll)' entries in the indcx) as a 
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major influence on Crabbe, possibly the greater of the two. Considering, how-
ever, his vision of Crabbe's achievement as occupying a definable stage in the 
great narrative sweep from Shakespeare via J ohnsan to Dickens and Eliot, I 
find it at the least misleading that New not only fails to make a precise 
acknowledgement to Speirs's related verdict but to omit any reference to such 
pioneering work towards the development of that vision as W. K. Brown's 
Tbe Triumph of Form (1948) Of "The Development of Crabbe's Narrative 
Art" (1947) by Arthur Sale, one of whose comparisons, that between Catherine 
Lloyd of the The Parish Register and Dinah of "Procrastination!! (Tales, IV), 
New handles too and to the same ends-if he doesn't know this important 
ar,tiele by a scholar at his o\vn alma mater, he ought to. 
Or is tIus quibbling along Germanic-American lines from which the more 
cavalier breed of English critic is by tradition exempt? Although observing 
that not all of New is new, I must point out that the fact itself is inevitable 
in so comprehensive a survey, that New does have many new things to say 
about Crabbe, and that when he comes to an independent judgment in dis-
agreement with general opinion or a particular predecessor he does so without a 
hint of ridicule or self-congratulation. And true to its title, George Crabbe's 
Poetry tells us rather little about Crabbe as a man but a great deal, more than 
anyone else alone has done, about Crabbe as a craftsman. 
R. L. CHAMBERLAIN 
Gnmd Valley State College 
The Romantic Sublime: Studies in the Structure and Psychology of Transcen-
dence by Thomas Weiskel. Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1976. Pp. xi + 220. $12.00. 
Can we still be interested in the sublime? Is the word too encrusted with 
hollow pedantry or soiled beyond recovery for serious discourse? The critic, 
like the poet, keeps purifying the dialect of the tribe, but whose dialect, of 
what tribe, grows ever more mysterious. The reclamation of any word seems a 
brawny task these days and the saving of the sublime more difficult than most. 
The late Thomas Weiskel, whose proDusing career was cut short by a 
tragic accident in 1974, performed a major feat of verbal rescue in The Romantic 
Sublime: Studies in the Structu1'e and Psychology of Transcendence. Weiskel 
affirms the central issue: "We should like to determine what in the Romantic 
ideology h~.s residual power, what we still share." Weiskel goes a long way 
in showing what power still resides in the concept of the sublime using his 
wide-ranging skills in literary history, psychoanalysis, semiotics, and old fashioned 
explication to dust off the moribund old word until it shines again. He is not 
rewriting or supplanting S. H. Monk's classic study on which any new student 
of the sublime must necessarily depend, but Monk's book is forty years old 
and we need to know where the sublime stands now. Harold Bloom teases us 
with an interesting but undeveloped theory of the sublime in Poetry and 
Repression (1976) but WeiskePs book is wholly centered there, and if he does 
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not work out a wholly coherent or convincing theory of the sublime, he points the 
way toward one. But first we must step back What is the sublime and where 
does it come from? 
The word itself means" below the threshold" but of course it has always been 
the release from that point upward to some form of ,transcendence that has 
fascinated sublimists. Longinus, who started it all in the first century, can no 
longer interest us as a writer on rhetoric-if he ever couId-but there are 
three places in Peri Hypsous that can still attract us, I think. Longinus emphasizes 
the" transport H induced by .elevated language and sees this state leading to the 
beautiful illusion of a self-hypnotic experience in which the soul believes in the 
sublime" and is filled with joy and vaunting, as though it itself has produced what 
it has heard." The transport in which one sublimes oneself leads finally near 
to Godhead because "in discourse we demand that which transcends the 
human:" Edmund Burke and Kant, the leading analysts of the sublime in the 
eighteenth century, do not go this far. Burke, who makes but slight mention 
of Longinus, focuses the source of the sublime on terror but is not interested in 
transcendence. He maps the sublime by studying those "ideas" which mal{e 
it up: obscurity, power, privation, vastness, infinity, difficulty, and magni-
ficence. These states are handled precisely and daringly by Burke in his famous 
Enquiry which anticipates the Romantic sublime, especially as it is manifested 
in Wordsworth, but he is not interested in anything beyond the human; the 
highly empirical Burke insists that "when \ve go one step beyond the sensible 
qualities of things, we go out of our depth." Burke's subtle discovery of 
delight, not pleasure, in terror might have led to a possibly transcendent psycho-
logy, but it did not. Burke remains firmly analytical in his approach to the 
emotions and is not, argues Weiskel, like Kant an "apologist. for the sublime." 
Kant, with whom Weiskel struggles mightily, is stili, I think, the profoundest 
analyst of the sublime although he hardly leaves any room for sublimity in the 
object. For Kant, "the sublime is what pleases immediately in opposition to 
the interest of sense." This Negative or Kantean sublime finally allows us to 
discount everything, including our life, as \N eiskel irritably argues. Kant 
characterizes the experience of the sublime as a sudden powerlessness followed 
by a reactive inflation in which we discover the grandeur of the ideas of reason 
in the mind. The limitlessness of the sublime object and the imagination's 
incapacity to represent it proves that the sublime cannot be found in nature 
but only in the subject, in ideas of reason. The sublime is therefore, as the 
be:mtiful is not, wholly subjective. Kant divides the sublime into two types: 
the matbematical, what Weiskel calls the on and on, in which we discover a 
limitless magnitude from which our reason finally demands a whole, and the 
dynamical sublime in which we confront the might of nantre which finally cannot 
hurt us because it rouses our faculties to their own "vaunting" as Longinus 
called it. The contemporary mind might wish to call this reaction-formation, 
and Bloom and others have shown the importance of anxiety in the making of 
the sublime. To Thomas Weiskcl Kant's sublime is melancholic and solipsistic 
and cannot help us find a way bac1{ to "our life." He wants to save something 
of the sublime for himself and for the reading of Romantic poetry. 
The opening sentence of The Romantic Sublime seems startling, although it 
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in feeling and in speech, transcend the human." I think this idea is not 
consistently developed in the book because the author is uneasy about leaving 
the human behind; but this very unease is complex and stimulating in its 
working out. Weiskel offers both a theory of the sublime and an application of 
it to particular authors. That the two do not always conflate need not disturb 
us because the author refuses to be held in his categories if they will not fit 
a sensitive reading. Briefly, he grounds his theory on what he calls the sublime 
moment which develops in three phases: (1) in which the mind stands in a 
determinate relation to the object in the linearity of normal perception, (2) in 
which the mind-object relation breaks down in an excess of the signified (the 
object) or the signifier (the mind) as in Wordsworth where Weiskel precisely 
says, "the object is always in danger of precipitant attenmation," and (3) a 
" reactive" phase in which the disturbance of phase two is taken "as sym-
bolizing the mind's relation to a transcendent order." This third phase is 
thinly described but Weislcel informs us brilliantly about phase two, which is, 
of course, apocalyptic in its nature. Adapting both Burke and Kant and much 
else from current disciplines, Weiskel himself offers two types of the sublime, 
one that is negative or metaphorical and one that is positive or metonymical; in 
the negative sublime the breakdown of phase two is resolved by substitution 
whereas, in the positive sublime, the mind recovers by "displacing its excess 
of signified into a dimension of contiguity which may be spatial or temporal." 
As I feel that the account of transcendence is inadequate or tentative in the 
book, so too the positive sublime, which the author associates with the 
assertion of identity in the egotistical sublime, is somewhat lacking in detail. The 
negative or metaphorical or reader's sublime points to vacancy and loss; the 
positive or metonymical or poet's sublime is apparently this life-enhancing and 
the author prefers it. But Weiskel's brilliantly compact examination of care-
fully chosen Romantic texts may make us wonder what the positive sublime is 
and where it can be found. What can this formula for the Romantic sublime 
tell us about Romantic poetry? 
It is not Weiskel's intention to classify Romantic poets in terms of the 
positive and negative sublime because, he says, such a symmetry would be false 
to poetic texts which may manifest both structures. Yet I think he tends to 
do just that: Wordsworth manifests and fights against the negative sublime; 
Shelley reaches for the positive sublime but flees from the recognition of 
identity it implies; Keats's notion of the egotistical sublime is a manifestation 
of the positive sublime through which Keats must pass, etc. Blake, to whom 
Weiskcl devotes an uneasy but brilliant chapter, is seen as an opponent of the 
Romantic sublime because the sublime threatens the autonomy of the imagination. 
An ingenious reading of Urizen's expulsion of Ahania in Night Three of 
The Four Zoas sees Urizen as a kind of Kantean reason casting out his wholeness 
for the sake of a destructive arrogation of the negative sublime: "Blake locates 
ruin in precisely the same mental event that Kant would celebrate." Yet 
Weiskel is not a Blakistj he asks for a new exoteric reading of Blake and 
confesses that, despite the enormous commentary of recent years, Blake is not 
getting easier to read. I would also point out that Blake owes much to the 
theory of the sublime as J\IIorton Paley proved in Energy and tbe Imagination. 
U The Tiger" is nothing if not a sublime poem, and the artists who influenced 
r 
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Blake, Barry, Fuseli, Mortimer, -etc., worked in the sublime manner. I think 
Blake belongs somewhere in any study of the sublime, and not simply as an 
ironist. Blake as sublimist needs further study and I'm sure he'll get it. 
Weiskel's chapter on William Collins demonstrates his subtle explicative 
talent and his skill in using Freud in non~reductive readings of the "Ode to 
Fear" and the" Ode on the Poetical Character." His concern with the" careers 
of egos within poems" is fully represented in his treatment of this vexing poet 
of the still unclarified Age of, Sensibility-in fact, these aIC some of the best 
pages on Collins I lrnow, a poet whom everyone has wished to be better than he 
is. Weiskel concentrates on the relation between Romance and the negative 
sublime in Collins whose "I" is neither equal to the full self-consciousness of 
the major Romantic poet nor to a realistic poetry of earth.' "When an I becomes 
self-conscious it requires an identity or convention of self-dramatization and 
Collins's is often not adequate to this self-consciousness." Milton, of course, 
shadows Collins who, according to Weiskel, would escape from him into the 
Romantic sublime but is unable to do so. Collins's search for authority poises 
him unhappily on the edge of Romance in a phallic anxiety that is not sublimated, 
or perhaps more accurately, repressed into the sublime, repression being, as 
Harold Bloom understands it, precisely that mechanism that releases the sublime 
by its own hyperbolical defence of itself. Weiskel is not saying that Collins 
is not a threshold poet, as we have ImoWfl, but the perils and defeats of his 
stance have never been described more exactly. Romance becomes family 
romance which becomes the yearning for transcendence. 
Using his model of the sublime, Thomas Weiskel darts brilliantly, but with 
uneven success, at other major Romantic poets. I find his picture of Keats 
conventional, his use of Wallace Stevens rather de rigueur, his omission of Byron 
unfortunate, and his treatment of Coleridge too sketchy. His critical theory 
serves him best with Wordsworth and Shelley, even though his equation of 
the positive sublime with the egotistical sublime leaves something to be desired. 
One wishes there were more pages on Shelley because the author's brief 
formulations about that poet are original and incisive. Shelley is observed 
correctly as the poet of desire least capable of sublimation who, nonetheless, 
seel{s identity on the Wordsworthian model-an intriguing idea for the reading 
of Tbe T"iunzpb of Life which Weiskel ignores except for calling ,attention to 
its" pathos of desire." Perhaps Weiskel is correct in arguing that" all roads 
in the positive sublime lead to identity" but he is also right to see Shelley's 
flight from identity and Wordsworth's aquisition of it through a near cataclysmic 
confrontation with the negative sublime. "Shelley's resistance to sublimation 
was such that he could not welcome identity as a saving project but identity 
was no less inevitable for all that." This is acute but too compact. A good 
reading of Alastor and a teasing one of Epipsycl:Jidion's climax do not give 
us sufficient texts for our perception of Shelley'S psychic situation, and I'm 
puzzled why the most transcendent and certainly most sublime of Shelley's poems 
is not examined. Adonais surely aspires to divination and some form of gadding 
seems essential to any kind of the sublime, The author suggests ingeniously that 
the rejection of the curse in Prometheus Unbound is extorted from Shelley 
"whose deepest defense remains denial." One would have liked to see that 
startling view developed further. 
If Shelley is the poet of the myth of desire, Wordsworth is the poet of the 
L 
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myth of memory. But WeiskeI shows that because desire has no end and 
memory no origin. "identity can never be completely accomplished." This 
mournful conclusion gives us a Wordsworth whom Weiskel presents with 
profound originality-the most important extension of Geoffrey Hartman since 
Wordsworth's Poetry twelve years ago. I think The Romantic Sublime is 
at its best on Wordsworth even though Weiskel seems to change his mind 
on whether Wordswonh belongs to the negative or positive sublime. He wants 
to align Wordsworth with the positive but his exciting readings of the famous 
epiphanic moments in The Prelude and elsewhere seem to me to point to Burke 
and Kant, and not to "the dimension of contiguity" at all. After the early 
pages of the book offer subde readings of II Resolution and Independence," 
Tintern Abbey and other poems, the last chapter, "Wordsworth and the Defile 
of the Word" does not hesitate to swing into those problematic depths where 
many have trudged before. What does Weiskel, with his background of the 
sublime, add to Hartman's unsurpassed reading of the Alpine crossing? He 
adds nothing directly to Hartman's view of the usurping imagination in Book 6 
because he accepts it-Hartman argues that Wordsworth discovers the bnagination 
but calls it nature-and goes on from there to examine the II symbolic order of 
Eternity n in the poem. He argues that the lines which discover the II Characters 
of the Great Apocalypse" (621-640) manifest the negative sublime while the 
earlier great passage about the "unfathered vapour" (592-617) shows the 
positive sublime. These are polarities that do not interfuse, but exist, side by 
side, both sublime. If you think, as this reviewer does, that the sublime always 
depends upon a negativity, you will not see these famous passages as polarities, 
but the author's brilliant readings of other cruces in The Prelude help him make 
his case. He is superb on the dream about the Arab in Book 5 (" Poetry is not 
threatened by apocalypse, but itself is the apocalypse"); the girl ascending the 
mountain in Book 12 demonstrates the poet's own fear of and flight from 
signification; the Sarurn plain lines in Book 12 (not often considered) are 
examined in the light of the poet's sacrifice of himself to attain the poetic 
power he both feels and frightens himself with. I am not suggesting these are 
final readings but tIley do suggest what we should mow: a great poem is 
inexhaustible to interpretation and will forever call forth its best exegetes. 
If Thomas Weiskel had lived, he might have pondered two problems his book 
leaves unresolved. I am not happy with his account of sublimation about which 
he admits we have insufficient data; he sometimes seems to confuse sublimation 
with repression. Secondly, Weiskel's account of transcendence seems without 
content. If the Longinian model of the sublime, which he develops with 
great subtlety and never really abandons, claims to transcend the human then 
some description of divination would seem to be forthcoming. He dismisses 
Nietzsche's sublime too easily: U heights of the soul from which even tragedy 
ceases to look tragic"; I would also suggeSt that the Nietzschean Overman or 
clown of God was one way the Romantic sublime was going and continues to 
go. The ritualistic identification with a mystery god that D. H. Lawrence 
enacted in his later career might offer us another model of the continuing 
sublime. But we have enough to be both exhilarated and saddened by this book. 
DANIEL HuGHES 
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F. O. Mattbiessen: The Critical Achievement by Giles Gunn. Seattle and London: 
University of Washington Press, 1975. Pp. xxv + 210. $9.50. 
Twenty-six years after the tragic death Qf F. O. Matthiessen, the first book~ 
length review of the accomplishments of this provocative critic has finally 
been completed. Long overdue was a study of the theories, visions and COll-
.fliers of this pioneer of American literature whose probing scholarship deter-
mined new guidelines for literary criticism. Summarizing more than he analyzes 
Matthiessen's ideas about literature, criticism and life, Gunn compassionately 
etches a picture of the "man within [his] work" (xviii), steadily searching 
to read not only cultural history through its traditions but the present through 
its illumination of the past. l\1atthiessell's life, ideas and their interrelatedness, 
particularly his key sources for viewing literature through Christianity, demo-
cracy and tragedy are neatly woven to give a complete picture of a man 
secure, for the most part, in his scholarship, though torn by the cultural 
deterioration of America and a war-stained world. This sympathetic picture of 
the relation "between what Matthiessen thought and wrote and who he was" 
(xviii) is delivered in a polished style of admiration that elucidates its subject's 
strengths and accomplishments. The major drawback to Gunn's book, however, 
is the _extensive summary of Matthiessen's major ideas and opinions, particularly 
those found in American Renaissance, with few discerning objections to 
his more pertinent yet debatable theories and observations. His underlining of 
the significant influences u,pon l\1atthiessen's life and work are superbly rendered, 
though too much of this information sometimes becomes repetitious. An 
examination of Eliot's and James's impact upon Matthiessell could have drawn 
sharper lines regarding what was assimilated and original in Matthiessen's early 
thinking, even though these writers did seem to have dominated much of his 
general perspective almost from the beginning. Still, any scholar not familiar 
with l\1atthiessen, particularly his masterpiece American Renaissance, should be-
come acquainted with this Harvard scholar's unique view of life and literature. 
For one already knowledgeable of any of Matthiessen's nine books, F. O. 
Matthiessen: The Critical Acbievement will further enhance one's appreciation 
of the force of his demanding character in striving for form, truthfulness and 
integrity, not only in his work but in his life as well. 
The structure of the book is built upon extensive summary, moderate com-
mentary and compelling glimpses of biography, including an introduction to 
Matthiessen's accomplishments and character. A conclusion on "The Nature 
and Quality of Matthiessen's Achievement" completes the work in which 
Matthicssen's "commitment to imagination ... and balance" as well as his 
"c~tho1icity of taste" in examining an artist's language (184-85) are under-
scored by Gunn. It was Matthiessen's "constant modulation of perception 
and judgment" which Gunn especially appreciates and thus has as one of the 
book's recurring themes Matthiessen's H obligation to the text itself and to the 
necessity of recovering it for contemporary appropriation ... " (186). Of Gunn's 
admiration for Mathiessen there can be little doubt. His familiarity with 
Mathiessen's texts and ideas exhibits a respect not only for his subject'S scope in 
his literary approach to different authors' works, but equally for his digressions 
into such fields as economic theory, epistemology, open-air painting, ethics, 
L 
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oratory, epic tradition, folklore, Calvinism, classicism, Zoroastrianism and the 
Bible. "Other critics might be more learned, more sophisticated, or more 
polished," reflects Gunn, "but few were so wise, so capacious, or so sensitive in 
registering their own divided responses to the work before them" (187). 
Because so much of F. O. Matthiessen is an enumeration of Matthiessen's 
theories and how they "emerge(d) in and shape(d) the course of his published 
writing" (xviii), it is difficult not to talk about Matthiessen, to some extent, in 
discussing this book. Turning to the text then and its opening chapter, the 
early critical influences from which Matthiessen later viewed his own literary 
scholarship are sketched, in a style exacting and crisp throughout, where 
Matthiessen is observed in the literary mainstream alongside such critics as 
Cleanth Brooks, M. H. Abrams, H. L. Mencken and Lewis Muruford. It is 
from these men that he drew many of his ideas, while reacting to what he 
considered an often narrow historical and biographical scholarship. Particularly 
influential was Vernon L. Parrington who, like Matthiessen, desired to find a 
"usable past" from which to measure man's unspent potential (for obviously 
differing reasons), although it was to Van Wyck BrooIes that the phrase U owed 
its popular expression" (17). Matthiessen's indebtedness to Brooks for his 
contribution to the revival of American literature is likewise observed in his 
gratitude to Eliot's The Sacred Wood, a book from which he borrowed and 
assimilated so many of his notions regarding theory and criticism. In his attempt to 
close the gap between the literary historian who regards his work as U primarily 
aesthetic and literary" and others like Frederick Turner and Henry Adams, 
whose material was essentially" political, social and economical" (4), Matthiessen 
looked to Eliot, as well as to Henry James, for an understanding in translating 
"social and cultural issues" into "questions of fonn and technique" (27). 
After clearly establishing James and Eliot rather than Poe or Coleridge (two of 
Matthiessen's other favorites) as providing the "strongest countenveight to 
Matthiessen's interest in social and cultural criticism " (26), Gunn studies in 
the following chapter Matthiessen's three early works: Translation: An 
Elizabethan Art, Sarah Orne Jewett and The Achievement of T. S. Eliot: An 
Essay on the Nature of Poetry. One of the better chapters in the book, "From 
the Art of Translation to the Achievement of Criticism," is strong for its solid 
analysis of each individual work, particularly Gunn's discussion of Matthiessen's 
distant relation, Sarah Jewett. Although Gunn remarks that these three works as a 
whole "did not exhibit at the outset of his career the mature critical grasp he 
was later to display in American Renaissance," they still evidenced hints and 
ideas upon which Matthiessen would mold his later thoughts. In Translation 
and Sarah Orne Jewett for instance, it was his purpose to display how literary 
art could reveal "important insights into the kind of personal and cultural 
history which that art might be said to mirror and help us repossess" (38). 
What makes Gunn's analysis of the latter work most compelling, however, is 
his ability to see into Matthiessell's emotional and intellectual weakness and 
to draw them with keen objectivity. Noting Matthiessen's forsaking of the 
U discriminations of criticism" (38) in Sarah Orne Jewett, Gunn perceives here, 
as well as in the remainder of the chapter, what he fails to do in his examination 
of American Renaissance, which was to critically address himself to the nature 
of art as well as to the responsibilities of the critic: Though questions are 
f 
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raised in tlus section, Gunn's later unwillingness to debate Matthicssen's notions 
of criticism's function and objectives is presently neglected in order to examine 
his subject morc as an apprentice than as an intrinsic critic. In his examination of 
T. S. Eliot, Gunn details in an enthusiastic manner many of Eliot's major ideas 
·",ich unfortunately reappear once too often in the book Nonetheless, it was 
essential that he details the main tenets of Eliot's philosophies, for these were the 
concepts that Matthiessen was later to adopt as his own. Such ideas, however, 
particularly Eliot's view of the organic relation among the II past, present, and 
perennial" (51), Gunn aptly remarks, would not attain full mature expression 
until his American Renaissance was completed. 
It would not be until the book's publication in 1941 then, along with the 
increase of European fascism and the breakdown of the American Popular Front, 
that Matthiessen would become determined in American Renaissance to provide 
"a distinctively American tradition founded upon liberal and democratic im-
pulses ... " (70). By seeking to place the works of five major writers, Emerson, 
Thoreau, Hawthorne, l\1elville and Whitman, not only in their time but in 
ours 2.S well, Matthiessen found what he believed to be a common bond among 
them, especially in their shared devotion to democracy and their attraction to 
organicism. However, by the third chapter Gunn's scholarly observances seem 
to falter slightly in his remarks on organic theory. Even with his awareness of 
Matthiessen's own temptations "to close too quickly the gap between the 
factual and the ideal, between what was really there in these writers as opposed 
to what he hoped to find" (133-34), Guoo still prefers to overlook Matthiessen's 
shortcomings in this section on the '" American Renaissance' and Organic 
Form." Because this term is so expansive and general in its many meanings, 
Gunn, in his discussion of Thoreau and organicism (the reconciliation of the 
one with the many, the individual society, appearance with reality) docs 
not clearly distinguish between Thoreau's organic prose and his perceptions. 
A writer's manner of expression is not necessarily at one with his vision, as is 
frequently the case with Melville. 
Thoreau's greater success in reconciling the finite with the infinite is appreciated 
by Matthiessen, though his slighting of Thoreau's sense of evil while offerinj! 
stronger recognition to Hawthorne for his understanding of good and evil is 
overlooked by Gunn. Even granting lvlatthiessen's basis for viewing Hawthrone 
as the more significant writer for tIus observation (including his more fully 
developed modes of experience and expression) does not necessarily set him 
in the category of an organicist like Whitman or Thoreau, unless particularly 
similar grounds are drawn. Thc term organicism in Matthiessen's writings has 
become too encompassing, too over-compensating, and thus too broadr.ncd for ~ 
solid basis of comparison. Therefore, the expansive strengths of all fiye 
writers, the varied differences in tIlcir organic practices, and the successes of 
their imaginativc reconciliations of narural forces through their art still 
need further comment and assessment. 
Guno is similarly !a..x in the chapter, It. American Renaissance' and the 
Pmsibility of Democratic Christi:mity" in which he essentially summarizes 
:\brrhiesscn's discussion of Hawthorne's and 1\'lclville's treatments of tragedy as 
democratic and Christi:m. Tt is not 1\1atthiessen's treatment of tragedy in the 
Christian tradition with which I have any quarrel. Rather, it is his discussion 
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of the myth of the common man and democracy as they relate to Hawthorne 
which I feel becomes strained. Though Gunn remarks upon this in one of 
Matthiessen's references to Hawthrone and his" sympathy" toward the common 
man, he fails to expound upon this tenuous argument from which Matthiessen 
hoped to support his claim. 
Y ct, this oversight might be excused for the sharpened reflections Gunn 
draws Ilcar the end of this chapter. Before numbering some of Matthiessen's 
critical faults, Gunn comes to the defense of his subject, a man whose optimism 
and aspirations during his lifetime were oftentime targets for cruel reviewers 
and heated public opinion. In defense of Matthiessen's liberal and democratic 
impulses, Gunn forcefully addresses his comments to the modern literary reader 
by noting: " ... more than thirty years after the publication of American 
Renaissance, we may well ask ourselves if l\1atthiessen's hopes were not ex~ 
aggerated ... .Indeed, if anything, we now seem to have become even more 
insensible to those 'undiminished resources' than we were in 1941, and this is 
nowhere more vividly exhibited than in the way we have revised Matthiessen's 
readings of the mid-nineteenth-century writers, substituting for them inter-
pretations that often evince comparatively litde feeling for the kind of usable 
potential Matthiessen found in them" (131). 
The remaining two chapters deal with Matthiessen's work on James and 
Theodore Dreiser and include some revealing comments from Matthiessen's From 
the Heart of Europe. Following this in the conclusion is a short appraisal of 
l\1atthiessen's achievements, both with the aforementioned major writers and 
minor writers like Katherine Porter, as well as regionalists such as Willa Cather. 
Gunn's examination of Henry James: The lvlajor Phase, a work which helped to 
begin the James revival, and Tbeod01"e Dreiser enumerates the significance 
Matthiessen brought to bear upon their works, while Gunn meanwhile weaves 
bits of pertinent biography, suggestive of reasons for Matthiessen's suicide. It 
is his occasional offering of personal data which greatly enhances this work and 
gives it an added emotional appeal. While the book's intent is not to be 
biographical, the book's subject, as well as its reader, requires some background 
to Matthiessen's aspirations, hopes and frustrations. In completing his final 
sections (including a Matthiessen bibliography)', it was unfortunate that Gunn 
did so little with the comment he paraphrases from Henry Nash Smith, who 
confided in Gunn that American Renaissance was more a work of art than a 
\vork of scholarship, "and that its conclusions, like its method of approach, 
were more a product of will and aspiration and brilliant intuition than of hard 
evidence and meticulous reasoning" (134). These comments, without question, 
could apply to many of Matthiessen's works, writings which sometimes seem 
more like" a poem" (Nash's term) than a cohesive, academic whole. 
Matthiessen's ultimate breakdown in literary achievement, however, occurred 
in Tl:Jeodo1"e Drieiser, which though hardly "a poem" still offered Gunn 
one of his more insightful moments in relating Matthiessen's weaknesses and 
strengths to his literary achievements and failures. By the time he began his 
work on Dreiser, Gunn notcs, Matthiessen had not only become very anxious 
over America's destiny, but had likewise developed a "growing obsession to 
make his work count for something" (170). Thus, his willingness to lower his 
own standards "in order to make Dreiser's virtues stand out more boldly" 
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(170-71) resulted in his inability to explain Dreiser's strengths in totally con-
vincing terms. Praising Dreiser for his consistency in empathizing with the 
victim, Matthiessen, in essence, became a victim to an unsympathetic society 
whose accusations regarding his homosexuality and communist sympathies 
brought him closer to Dreiser when he noted the novelist's chief goal was "to 
arouse compassion for anyone caught in the clutches of incomprehensible circus-
stances" (172). Theodore Dreiser, a critical biography, was left unfinished at 
the time of Matthiessen's death. 
Gunn's book, though hardly unfinished, could have been more critical of its 
subject's achievements. Interesting and cogently expressed in offering masterful 
glimpses into the author's sympathies, life and work, F. O. Matthiessen is 
nonetheless essentially a summary of Matthiessen's literary,. religious and egalitarian 
ideas. While at times probing, Gunn refuses to be more thorough in answering 
the obvious charges laid against Matthiessen's scholarship these past twenty 
years. This is not to talce away from the fact that this book should be read by 
even the most general literary scholar; for it still enumerates in clear and 
forceful prose the significant ideas and theories of one of our most fascinating, 
complex and exceptional critics. 
GARY SIMON 
Dane, Wisconsin 
Defoe's Narratives: Situations and Structures by John J. Richetri. Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1975. Pp. viii + 244. $21.00. 
No matter from what perspective critics approach Daniel Defoe's novels, they 
are soon confronted with a basic contradiction, usually expressed as a con-
fusion between secular and religious values. Traditionally, this problem has led 
to lengthy discussions of conscious or unconscious irony in Defoe's narratives 
or to a series of repeated efforts to advance the claims of one or the other of 
these two competing realms. In an earlier study, Popular Fiction Before 
Richardson (1969), John Richetri, instead of arguing for the pre-eminence of 
either secular or religious values in early eighteenth-century narratives, described 
this confrontation not in terms of an irreconcilable confusion, but rather as a 
meaningful and essential relationship. In Richetti's most recent study, Defoe'S 
Narratives: Situations and Structures, the terms of the contradiction become 
those of the self and the other. Religious and secular values combine to become 
one side of a conflict with the demands of the autonomous self on the other. 
Although Richetti treats each novel separately, he describes the relationship 
between self and other in three different but obviously related ways. Like a 
number of other critics now preoccupied with eighteenth-century conceptions 
of the self, Richetti has turned to Hume's version of personal identity as a way 
of defining the problem, although he does not address himself to the difficulty 
of applying Hume's categories to a writer whose novels appeared a generation 
earlier than A Treatise of Human Nature. Defoe's Narratives becomes, in part, 
a study of the paradoxical but reciprocal relationship between the perceiving 
self and the world perceived, between the self as II free and prior to experience" 
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and the self as "the mere result of eXiperience." Richetti also locates in Defoe's 
novels a theory of the self in which an innate and essentially aggressive "will 
to power" is transformed into a morally acceptable "will to survive" in the 
face of extremely hostile environments (Crusoe's island, for example, or Moll 
Flanders' London). Thus, Richetti can describe the "characteristic pattern of 
Defoe's narratives" as one of "free action in the context of compelling cir~ 
cumstances." The third conception of the self that Richetti traces through the 
novels involves a dichotomy between desire and social mastery. In Defoe's 
fictional world, social mastery depends upon holding unqualified natural desires 
in check. Richetti argues, using the example of Roxana, that as soon as a 
character admits to natural affections and needs, he sacrifices some degree of 
social control over others. 
My summary of Richerti's argument in Defoe's Narratives should make it clea~ 
that his critical procedures involve locating patterns of confrontation between 
paradoxical but competing forces and holding the inconsistencies in some kind 
of balance, instead of trying to explain away the contradictions by emphasizing 
either side of the confrontation. What becomes particularly interesting and 
perhaps problematic about Richetti's method is that he takes a Marxist approach 
to Defoe's contradictions-Marxist not so much in terms of an analysis of 
economic and historical forces at work in Defoe's world, though throughout 
the book there are passing references to the social and economic contradictions 
of a market society, as an attempt to deal with Defoe's numerous contra-
dictions and inconsistencies by employing the techniques of dialectical analysis. 
Since dialectical analysis allows for a full and complicated response to the 
phenomenon of contradiction, this approach represents a significant contribution 
to Defoe criticism because it regards contradiction not as a problem to be 
resolved away but precisely as the starting point for further investigation. 
Richetti's use of dialectical analysis does, to be sure, present problems. But 
before confronting them, I want to emphasize here the success with which 
he employs a prose style perfectly designed to reflect and analyze the con-
tradictory yet reciprocal forces at work in Defoe's narratives. Richetti's own 
sentences are examples of concepts held in a dialectical relationship with one 
another, dialectical in the sense that an idea is developed and brought to 
completion by simultaneously seeing it in relation to its opposite. Not sur-
prisingly, some of Richetti's best sentences pair off such oppositions as limitation 
and liberation, freedom and necessity, nature and society. It is by juxtapositions 
such as these that Richetti can demonstrate convincingly that that which 
" threatens" the self simultaneously "defines" it as well. 
Dialectical analysis, then, is a method of relating and developing ideas which 
leads to conclusions of some subtlety and precision. But it can also encourage 
formulaic rigidity and a resulting lack of clarity . Take, for example, the 
following passage: "The new first term (self needing to move forward 
aggressively for survival) negates the negation of the second term (other, 
Moll's declining circumstances), and the conjunction produces a third term 
(self, now fully realized because balanced, moving forward while apparendy 
still)." This quotation comes as a summary of an extended discussion of Moll 
Flanders' criminal career. Although we are invited here to engage in the 
familiar triadic movement of dialectical analysis, at the same time I wonder 
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If RichettPs commitment to dialectical analysis betrays him on occasion into 
formulaic statements. another issue that we need to confront here is whether he 
explains his approach as a method of literary analysis as fully as he ought to. 
Although it becomes clear, as we read through Defoe's Narratives, what 
critical tradition Richerti is working in (Lukacs, Lucien Goldman, Rene 
G~ard), I wonder whether dialectical criticism has gained such wide-spread 
acceptance and understanding in this country that it can be presented without 
a rather comprehensive introduction. Only a few years ago Frederick Jameson 
could lament in Marxism and Form that unlike the intellectual milieu in Europe 
there was no true Marxist culture in America. In spite of the efforts of 
Jameson and a small group of like-minded critics, has the situation changed so 
very much? I am not denying the validity of Marxist or dialectical modes of 
criticism out of hand but rather suggesting that their methods and assumptions 
still need more explicit and self-conscious examination than they receive here. 
In addition to raising general methodological questions, Richetti's specific 
application of dialectical analysis to Defoe's novels also presents problems. To 
some extent, his own critical methods with their carefully balanced attention to 
the competing forces of the self and the other underestimate the extent of 
Defoe's anti-social tendencies and overemphasize the importance of community 
in Defoe's narratives. For example, Richetti sees Captain Singleton's return to 
England as an acceptance of social restraint. It is true, of course, that the act 
itself of returning is some kind of admission of social realities. At the same time, 
the paroxysms of disguise that Singleton and his friend William engage in upon 
their return (revealing themselves to no one, not even to relatives, wearing 
the beards and clothes of Greek merchant.'l, and never speaking English in 
public) hardly suggest much adjustment to English society. Richetti's dialectical 
method implies and requires such social accommodations, yet it fails to re-
cognize fully the obsessive fears that Defoe's narrators display when confronted 
with the world. Dialectical analysis may be a comprehensive way of dealing 
with Defoe's inconsistencies. At the same time, I am not convinced that even 
dialectical analysis can solve the problem of the radical and finally irreducible 
contradictions of Defoe's narratives. 
CEmISTOPHER W. GAY 
University of Massachusetts-Boston 
Forms .of the Modern Novella. by Mary Doyle Springer, Chicago: The University 
of Chicago Press, 1975. Pp. ix + 198. $12.00. 
We can not imagine a science that lacks a common vocabulary of word and 
symbol: chemistry without the periodic table, or biology without taxonomy. 
is impossible. Unfortunately, the so-called '~sciences of man," literary criticism 
among them, continue to remain hampered by inaccurate terminology and 
private languages. The Chicago school of neo-Aristotelian criticism has become 
one of the very small number of critical enterprises which, whatever its other 
merits, has already developed a common language and theory. This, in rum, 
has enabled its exponents to settle some issues at least provisionally, and to move 
on to others, especially in the theory of prose fictions. 
IIlil 
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It is particularly instructive to watch a criticism of genre developing within 
this system, exfoliating out of several seminal works of the last thirty years. 
To discuss Mary Doyle Springer's very helpful book is also, inevitably, to 
discuss the earlier essays and concepts whose contributions to her genre theory 
she summarizes in the book's first fifteen pages. It is a theory which can 
adapt a remark from one of Wimsatt's essays (hostile to the Chicago -critics) 
to its own uses: "The goodness of a saw, its capacity to cut, is determined by 
the steel fashioned in a certain shape" (p. 11).~ Prof. Springer reverses this order 
of precedence. seeing the envisioned "capacity to cut" as primary "function" 
or "purpose" (the two, words are used interchangeably), and the shape as 
derivative. Not accidentally, this evokes Kenneth Burke's identification of 
form with "the functioning of a structurc to achieve a certain purpose" (p. 
11) . The relevant forms or structures are not saws, of course, but literary 
works, and the relevant functions arc the effects that the works are intended 
to have on an audience. Although she takes altogether too much for granted 
when she discusses these psychological effects, Prof. Springer never confuses 
the intentions of a work's designer with the intentionality that is inherent in 
and manifested by the designs of the novella's several forms. 
Novellas, she insists, are not long short stories or short novels, though they 
are almost always between 15,000 to 50,000 words long. The genre is defined 
by its own "special powers [which] are not simply a matter of degree" (p.5). 
Nor is the genre definable by the historical circumstances of its origins in the 
pages of nineteenth-century magazines, whose policy it was to set limits to 
length. Instead, it is the relation of length to function that becomes central to 
the definition of genre which is presented here. There exist "a series of formal 
functions which can best be achieved at that length, functions which cause 
authors intuitively or consciously to choose that length" (p. 9). What Prof. 
Springer is . claiming for this particular genre is, as Claudio Guillen has shown 
in a formidable essay, characteristic of all genres. To read his "On the Uses 
of Literary Genre' 2 alongside the book under review is to be convinced that 
the model of a genre exists not as a prescription but as a potential, an inwtation 
for a dynamic coupling of certain forms, themes and modes in order to achieve 
a chosen rhetorical purpose. Most of this book is an inspired catalogue of the 
several forms subsumed within the genre of the novella, and an examination of 
their probable psychological effects on the reader. 
The modes which help to differentiate the various forms of the novella-genre 
are, as Prof. Springer acknowledges, borrowed from Sheldon Sacks's Fiction 
and the Shape of Belief. Assuming that all fiction involves characters in some 
action/conflict, she distinguishes three strains: the Action uses II unstable re-
lations between characters that are tightly plotted in order to be resolved into 
either [sic] a tragic, comic or serious effect," while the Apologue "makes use 
of characters and what happens to them to maximize the truth of a statement" 
1- Willi~m ~. Wimsatt, "The Chicago Critics," The Verbal Icon, ([Lexington]: 
r 
1 
The Umverslty Press of Kentucky, 1954), p. 62. Springer errs in assuming the 
remark is originally Wimsatt's; he is quoting a third party. 
Z Claudio Guillen, Literature as System: Essays Toward the Theory of I 
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(p. 10). Lastly, the Satire is often more loosely episodic than the others, but 
since it has" the purpose of ridiculing objects in the world outside the story n 
Cp. 10), it too maintains a coherence of vision. Rather half-heartedly, Prof. 
Springer also adopts Sacks's claim that since these modes are "principles of 
wholeness" in the Aristotlean tradition, they must remain mutually exclusive. 
This commitment to theoretical purity creates most of the book's problems, 
and a similar commitment-often confused with consistency-is responsible for 
the failure of Chicago criticism whenever it has to deal with mixed genres, 
such as encyclopedic narrative. David Richter's useful recent book (which is 
related to this one, and advertised on its back cover) sputters in frustration 
when confronted with Pynchon's V. because he, like Prof. Springer, prefers 
a powerful but inevitably limited critical orthodoxy. 
The first and most important of the six forms of the novella-genre is called, 
confusingly enough, the "apologue," after the mode which produces it when 
coupled with the length and devices of the novella. More than a dozen 
examples of the form are mentioned, and four are discussed at some length. 
Based on this sample, Prof. Springer prepares "a compendium of the signals" 
which can serve to identify the apologue-novella; this occupies fourteen pages 
(pp. 39-53) and represents a checklist which is both very helpful and slightly 
ridiculous. When she lists the first of nine such signals, labeled " distance from 
protagonist's character," and discusses the five variations or devices which come 
under it, an orgy of categorization seems under way; yet the author clearly 
shows that each of these signals is derived from a large sample of novellas to 
whose length the device mentioned is particularly suited. For example, the 
distance maintained between us and the protagonist by a device such as killing 
him off when the story opens (The Death of Ivan llyich) would seem intolerable 
in a novel-length fiction. Here, it serves to focus our attention on the apologue's 
statement. 
Since it is impossible to summarize or criticize all the details of Prof. Springer's 
discussion of the apologue-novella, it is worth looking at her extended analysis 
of one of the chosen representatives of this form, D. H. Lawrence's The Woman 
Who Rode Away. She shows how the end of the plot's events is fore-ordained, 
how early in the story the unnamed protagonist accepts the inevitability of her 
own death so that, as with Ivan llyich, only the most naive reader can read on 
anticipating a reprieve, and focusing on plot. Other elements of the fiction, 
such as diction and the emphasis on ritual, all serve to obtain the reader's 
assent (" whether he personally likes the statement or not "~p. 27) to the 
author's claims about the nameless woman, namely, that" she must die, and we 
must feel the fearfulness of it, not for the sake of tragic fulfillment, but for the 
sake of the message: that female restlessness must be overwhelmed (must 
" die") by that shaft of sunlight which is the phallic principle, a profoundly 
different matter, it is made clear, from mechanistic male domination" (p. 26). 
I cannot help doubting the possibility of always separating "message" 
from "character", let alone of maintaining the hierarchy which is claimed as 
necessary for the form. To take as example a novella mentioned by Prof. 
Springer, Melville's Benito Cerel1o, I do not think that its message, the color-
blindered vision characteristic of a whole culture, can be separated from the 
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paradoxical and blind vision, but is its only full embodiment for us in the 
fiction. 
Yet Prof. Springer's "compendium of the signals of the apologue" is so 
thorough that even as one disagrees with one signal, one is forced to admit that 
the cluster of signals can function much like a diagnostic manual's checklist of 
symptoms; not all of the items mentioned will appear in anyone case, but enough 
will do so to enable us to identify the genre and perhaps the form. Of 
course, the importance of such identification is not merely that it satisfies the 
more compulsively orderly critics among us, but that it can purify our critical 
language while shaping our expectations, and therefore our response and judge-
ment. In view of this, it is a pity that Prof. Springer does not expand her cryptic 
remarks on two famous short stories, Shirley Jackson's "The Lottery" and 
William Faulkner's" A Rose for Emily," both of which she identifies as apologue-
novellas manques, which fail because the authors "did not sustain and enlarge 
their statements at an appropriate length" (p. 52). 
The second form Prof. Springer establishes is rather awkwardly called "the 
apologue that teaches by example." This is defined by its "ability to focus 
clearly on what happened to a single central character and still cause its state-
ment to dominate the fiction" (p. 56). The example-novella seems to me to 
be a more narrowly focused variant of the apolo~c-novclla, and I cannot help 
feeling that the two distinctions Prof. Springer emphasizes are not enough to 
justify the creation of this second category. These distinctions are, first, that 
the focus on a central character is nearly exclusive and designed to encourage 
us "to apprehend him as a representative of an exampled way of life" (p.56), 
and second, that the universality of the character's condition is heavily stressed. 
Both Crane's Maggie and Solzhenitsyn's One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich 
are examined, and Prof. Springer makes her best case for this separate form 
with the stress she puts on Ivan, not as a character, but as an exemplary" prisoner 
in this kind of place" (pp. 65-6), which is to say, not just in the prison-camp 
but the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, it seems very difficult to separate our 
responses to the general statement from the one concrete reality which we know, 
the character of Ivan. Furthermore, when we compare this novella with 
Lawrence's, we see that though the place in which the woman who rode away 
is ritually killed by the Indians is exotic, the message derived from it is' 
intended to be universal, and aims at the life of western men and women as 
Lawrence saw it, "an exampled way of life," in Prof. Springer's terms. The 
differences in generality in the two novellas are at best matters of degree, not of 
kind. 
The satire-novella, the third of six generic forms, results from a combination 
of the third of Sacks's modes with the novella's length and devices; in that 
sense, its structure parallels that of the apologue-novella. Prof. Springer defines 
it U as the kind of whole where the parts cohere in humorous ridicule of objects 
in the real world that depart from a good that is clearly suggested within the 
work itself" (p. 99). For" objects," we would do better to read people and 
attitudes. At any rate, Prof. Springer claims that this form is particularly 
successful because the length-limitation of the novella forces the satirist to 
choose his targets and episodes carefully, as satirists who have had the scope of 
larger and looser forms-Swift is mentioned-did not always do. 
r 
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The final three forms established by Prof. Springer lack the sharp definition 
of the first and third. They include the novella as "degenerative tragedy" 
(e. g. Kafka's Metamorpbosis), the novella with a "serious plot of character 
revelation" (e. g. The Tum of The Screw) and the novella with the" serious 
plot of learning or failed learning" (e. g. Joyce's The Dead (!) and James's 
The Aspern Papers). The se,parate discussions of the examples of each form are 
enlightening, but incapable of justifying the author's enthusiasm for the pro-
liferation of subclasses. This last third of the book especially, and indeed the 
book as a whole, would have been much better had Prof. Springer been con-
sistent in examining the functions possible within a genre instead of the categories. 
Faced with a similar but tougher predicament, Roman Jakobson realized that an 
enormous number of categories would be needed to make a classification that 
could encompass all linguistic utterances, and so he chose to outline instead a 
scheme of all the possible functions of language; he was satisfied with just six. 
In any statement, such as U Hello, how are you? ", one function-here, the 
phatic-would be foregrounded, while the others might be absent, or be present 
and suppressed in various degrees, thus making any number of combinations or 
categories possible. Prof. Springer uses an idea very close to foregrounding 
when she discusses the relative importance given to character and action in 
the apologue-novella, but at no point does she give precedence to the con~ 
cepts of function and foregrounding over that of « form". Her book is very 
useful because it is a pioneer and scrupulous study of a neglected genre and of 
the ways in which one might approach a definition of its forms. Its mistakes 
are made in a style so clear and in the course of an argument so lucid that they, 
too, stimulate and teach. 
KHACHIG TOLOLYAN 
Wesleyan University 
Occasional Form. Henry Fielding and the Chains of Circumstance, by J. Paul 
Hunter. Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1975. 
Pp. xiv + 263. $12.00. 
The broad theme of this book is that Fielding's writings reflect the uncertainties 
of a changing world rather than any unshakeable confidence in older, " Augus-
tan" stabilities. It goes further in this view than previous critics, both in 
arguing that these uncertainties are evident well before the time of Amelia, and 
in seeing them as pervasive rather than merely occasional or local in much of 
the earlier work. Tom Jones, about which Mr. Hunter writes very well, is 
seen as the" epic" of this" modern consciousness", and some readers may feel 
that Mr. Hunter has too loose a conception of what he wants "epic" or 
U modem" to mean. He worries at the "epic" with a not wholly adequate 
sense of what its associations with the "heroic" would mean to an age which 
still had an active familiarity with older heroic poems, and superimposes on 
this some undefined "epic" quality applicable to later sensibilities for whom 
the U heroic" was not in any sense an important preoccupation. 
illl! 
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With ", modernity" too there are difficulties. Mr. Hunter's sense of the 
individual complexity of Fielding's works is rich, precise and enlightening, but 
his sense of how periods can be defined or described is something unduly 
simple or rigid. Fielding's age is too bluntly described as "marking the shift 
from medieval to modern in England," and he speaks crudely of writers being 
"pro- " or "anti-Augustan" in a way which almost implies that" Augustanism" 
was a matter of conscious and as it were party-political allegiance. 
The book deals with all the major narrative works except Jonathan Wild (an 
odd omission in view of Mr. Hunter's special interests, unsatisfactorily explained 
on p. 235 n. 1), with Shamela, and with a selection of plays. Mr. Hunter is at 
his best on Joseph Andrews, Tom jones and Amelia, but the early chapters are 
full of good insights and useful information. There is a most interesting account 
of the Tragedy at Tragedies, and of the figures which lie behind that play's 
allusive universe: Shakespeare (a particularly good discussion of the jokes of 
allusion and of pointedly omitted allusion to Shakespeare is given at pp. 24-32) j 
Dryden; Scriblerus, Swift and Pope. A chapter on II Fielding's Reflexive Plays" 
from The Author's Farce to the Rehearsal-plays of 1736-7 comes to the con-
clusion (shared by most students of the subject) that these plays are an example 
of a peculiar manner which was to reach full success only in the novels. A 
slightly laboured discussion of Shamela argues that Fielding'S "emphasis fell 
heavily upon the absurdity of the enemy, more heavily than upon alternative 
values, but he was on his way to the method of Joseph Andrews, which offered 
positive, fully articulated values in a no-less-funny book." The chapter opens 
up to joseph Andrews with a deft summary on pp. 92-3 of the many things in 
Shamela which prefigure the bigger book. 
In Chapter 5, with joseph Andrews, the book comes into its own. As if to 
herald the fact, the chapter opens with a new directness and confidence in 
Mr. Hunter's own writing. Good insights show how Fielding manipulates 
and betrays the reader's expectations, notably on the question of Joseph's 
chastity. The sustaining of that chastity has an element of surprise, because the 
mock-Richardsonian context would lead us to expect his "fall" rather than 
his "folly". Mr. Hunter brings out the special nuances of Joseph's comicality, 
and their relation to Fielding's serious :ittitude to chastity, with both subdety 
and good sense. Joseph's transition from comic absurdity to the status of "a 
mature, sensible hero" is finely observed, and Mr. Hunter writes better than 
any other critic kno·wn to me on Fielding's comic emphasis on Joseph's sexual 
appeal in childhood, and the witty suggestions of his precociously Priapic 
though unutilised virility. He has new things to say about Fielding's choice of 
the Biblical names of Joseph and Abraham, and refers us to Thomas Morgan's 
Tbe Moral Philosopher (1737-40) and the controversy which it aroused, in order 
to bring out contemporary notions about the two Biblical personages and their 
prominence in contemporary consciousness. Unlike some critics, Ivir. Hunter 
does not over-interpret or overSimplify the importance of the Biblical or theo-
logical background, and understands that Fielding is not "writing a theological 
treatise": the religious overtones help to define "reader expectation" rather 
than to supply the novel with a bogus thematic armature. 
The whole method of tlns book at its best is to resist turning particulars into 
themes. The insistence throughout is on the play of circumstance, the whiff 
-01' 
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of the particular detail. A remarkably successful discussion of Thwackum and 
Square in Tom Jones argues against the common view of these characters as 
"created representatives of concepts." To those of US who might feel tempted 
to refer to the many proclaimed preferences for "generality" in literature by 
writers of the time, including Fielding himself, Mr. Hunter refreshingly replies 
that" the mid-eighteenth century (conditioned by lampoons, chroniques scan-
daleuses, and the standard devices of journalism) fostered a tendency to read 
everything in terms of personal attack gnd local application." This counter-
uuth is worth asserting. And Iv1r. Hunter writes with fresh detail of the 
various possible real-life models for Thwackum and Square in a way which 
enables him to show that these characters would have seemed to contemporary 
readers not "gross and absurd caricatures," but "highly believable." Through-
out the book, we are made to feel the press of contemporary incidents, pub-
lications, preoccupations, as competing with traditional forms and echoes in a 
tense and creative vitality: "eighteenth-century works have a special depen-
dence upon contexts beyond the biographical; their burden is the burden of 
the present." 
Mr. Hunter often plays down the importance of patterns of symmetry and 
order in Fielding. On a few occasions, he shows an (in my opinion) unnecessary 
loss of nerve in making obeisances to critics who take a different view. But 
most of the time he maintains his ground with both firmness and subtlety, 
showing again and again how in Joseph Andrews and Tom Jones Fielding's 
favourite ideals are under pressure from brute fact; how "The world of time 
has intruded upon timeless visions, demonstrating that perfection exists no 
longer and that anxiety for it can deceive and corrupt"; and how "writers 
continued to operate from retreating premises long after communal agreement 
ceased~and without full consciousness either that the premises had to be 
defended or that, in equally many cases, the premises had become merely verbal 
formulas holding a place for newer premises not yet articulated." 
Mr. Hunter goes on to argue that such stresses show themselves not only in 
Amelia, where they are on the whole well-recognised, but in earlier work, and 
that the ending of Tom Jones especially shows a weariness and rigidity that 
loole forward to the final novel. His closing comment on Tom Jones is that 
its "radical symmetry ... at once asserts the absolute order and calls all into 
doubt." 
A final chapter, previously published in a different form, deals with Amelia. 
It is a most distinguished discussion, acute, sensitive and rich in detailed obser-
vation. It has become well-known in its earlier form, aud does not need 
extensive comment here, except to say that it is valuable not only for what 
it says about Amelia but also for the light it throws on the earlier work. Then, 
in a fascinating brief comparison betvveen Fielding and Richardson as writers 
who, for all their mutual antagonism and their differences of character and 
style, had to respond to a similar cultural situation at the same moment in time, 
Mr. Hunter says of the final novels of each: 
After two novels of heroines Richardson tries, not very successfully, to draw 
a hero, just as Fielding had gone from two heroes to a failed heroine. That 
England's two best writers at mid-century both failed in their last and least 
characteristic novels is a kind of joke on the century's search for direction 
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Among other and more incidental excellences of this book, there is a partic-
ularly enlightening account of the travel-metaphor in Joseph Andrews and Tom 
Jones, of the nature of travel-symbolism (" Unlike the grand hotel in old films 
or the rooming house in high school plays, journey is not ouly a conveulence but 
a repository of a whole series of traditional meanings"), of recent changes in 
travel-literature towards the prosaic and the trade-minded, and of differences 
between those eighteeoth-century novels which involve travel and those which 
are set in one place. Again and again there are sharp insights and thought-pro-
voking or witty formulations: on Fielding's treatment of his readers (pp. 7-8); 
on the reason why "so many eighteenth-century men wrote competent dull 
verse" (p. 18: "The culprit is not Reason or Rules or the "rigidity 11 of the 
couplet, but a notion of self-discovery that seeks in the past cultural affinities 
at personal, spirimal expense "); on Cibber, who "was ... not only humorous 
and comical but also ultimately as silly and trivial as he liked to pretend" 
(p. 89); on Hervey, who" bore the seal of the Walpole government long before 
he administered it" (p. 91); and many others. 
Against these, one may set some infelicities of expression, sometimes merely 
inelegant or inappropriate, sometimes confusing and perhaps confused: "One 
common complaint against enthusiasts was that emotionality dilated beyond their 
stated intentions U (p. 84); U Traditional kinds tend either toward imitation or 
evitation" (p. 86, and U evitation," Ie evitational" passim); Joseph's "inability 
to cope makes him susceptible to the physical punishment usually absorbed by 
schmucks and fools" (p. 108); '" democratizers' like Richardson" (p. 138); 
"stunning judgmental thrust" (p. 185). 
A few other cavils. I think Mr. Hunter draws undue inferences from the 
verbal difference between Milton's need to "justify" God's ways and Pope's 
desire to "vindicate" them (p. 187); it would have been nice to see Christopher 
Hibbert's attractively illustrated book on The Grand Tour mentioned among 
the "more recent discussions" (p. 241 n. 2); and there are a good few misprints. 
But this is a rich, intelligent and rewarding volume, and students of Fielding 
are greatly in Mr. Hunter's debt, though I daresay some may be too hidebound 
or too churlish to admit it. 
c. J. RAWSON 
University of Warwick 
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